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Abstrak 
Meskipun rezim Suharto telah Jatuh) selama lebih dari dua tahun dan Indonesia telah 
melaksanakan pemilu yang paling adil selama setengab abad usia kemerdekaan, namun tetap 
belum juga muncul hasil yang cukup berarti dalam reformasi di Indonesia. Tipe birokrasi 
Indonesia diduga telah menjadi factor penyebab kemandegan langkah reformasi ini. Tulisan ini 
mencoba mencari penjelasan mengenai sebab-sebab buruknya implementasi kebijakan dari akar 
kesejarahan yaitu dari keterbatasan-keterbatasan kelembagaan. 
Kata kunci : collegial, abdi dalem, rational bureau, ideological bureau 
Indonesia lacks neither programs for economic, social, and political reform nor capable 
individuals to staff them. Yet some two years after the fall of the Suharto regime and one of the 
fairest elections in a half century of independence Indonesia appears no closer to recovery than it 
was immediately after the beginning of the Asian crisis. Rather than want of, sometimes good, 
advice on how to overcome the crisis, the problem lies with shortcomings in implementing 
existing programs. This is most clearly reflected in the uncharacteristic cautious attitude on the 
part of foreign investors. Hesitation to commit themselves and their resources even under the 
National Unity Cabinet assembled by the new President is possibly a reaction to disappointment 
with past performance in the “reformation era” than a judgment of present prospects. Yet until 
proven otherwise, the apparent inability to make substantive improvements in the present system 
tends to be attributed to the fact that Indonesians are hopelessly corrupt, incompetent, or both. 
This essay seeks explanation for poor policy implementation policy in historically 
determined institutional constraints. Such constraints successively and selectively produced, if 
not the system, at very least the boundaries within which that system could take form. In long-
term perspectives reaching back to precolonial times many of the practices considered 
dysfunctional to a reformed administrative system are recognizable continuations of reactions to 
                                                          
1
 Professor, Southeast Asian History and Indonesian, Department of east Asian Languages, Lund University, 
Sweden. E-mail: mason.hoadley@ostas.lu.se 
 
Modern Indonesian Administration (Mason C. Hoadley)                 5  
 
external circumstances which have subsequently become institutionalized. Administrators tend to 
conform to a system’s norms which in turn have been inherited from the past. The approach is by 
no means a type of cultural reductionism in the form of “such is dictated by tradition and/or 
culture”. Nor does it minimize the pernicious effects of unchecked personal sell-interest, 
especially on the part of high-ranking officials. Rather it attempts to understand the workings of 
Indonesian administration within its own institutional premises and unique historical 
developments rather than within the context of modern, alien standards imposed from without. 
ADMINISTRATION 
For practical reasons the paper confines itself to the Javanese variant of Indonesian 
administrative practice. Preserved as copper plate and stone inscriptions, palm-leaf manuscripts, 
as well as documents written on Javanese tree-bark paper (dluwong, Chinese rice paper, and 
European-manufactured paper, only the Javanese historical sources provide a sufficient body of 
continuous information for tracing developments down to the present. In any event Javanese 
dominate the central administration which as a result tends to reflect their values and norms. 
Reason for the choice of subject lies in administration’s dual role as a mediator of power 
and its senatorial function. Administration is what stands between ruler and ruled. Moreover, it is 
the instrument for conveying orders, regulations, decisions, laws, and the like from the political 
elite to the masses. To a certain extent the reverse is true, especially in acceptance or lack 
thereof. Just as some metals are better conductors than others by virtue of their relative 
resistance, some administrative forms have more resistance to currents from the top or bottom of 
the power pyramid. At the same time administration’s senatorial role dampens potential swings 
between extreme measures. This means that by its very nature it is conservative. Today’s 
administration is manned by yesterday’s ideals. This can be positive, as in preventing swings to 
dictatorial forms, or negative in slowing down or even effectively stopping the pace of reform. 
ADMINISTRATIVE TYPES 
The point of departure is the observation that Javanese administrative systems are 
characterized by the interplay of several identifiable types. Two indigenous and two foreign are 
singled out for consideration. The first two, “collegial” and “abdi-Dulem” (Javanese for “servant 
of the court”) are local. They are also traditional in that Javanese administrations from the 
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fourteenth century, and possibly earlier, have alternated between the two. Of the foreign types, 
aspects of what can be termed a rational-bureaucratic mode were introduced as part of the 
Netherlands East Indies administration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
“Bureaucracy” in the Weberian sense, however, applied only to those technical functions which 
were staffed primarily by Dutchmen and operated directly under colonial authority. They were 
bureaucratic to the same degree as the concept developed within administrative circles in The 
Netherlands. The other foreign model was in many respects a variant of the rational-bureaucratic 
one, with its basic principles complemented and in some case countermanded by the demands of 
political ideology. The name “ideological-bureaucratic” is logically a conflict of terms. In 
common with “collegial” and “abdi Dalem”, “bureaucracy” relates to how policy is 
implemented, “ideology” to the basis of that policy. Yet it is the non logical or a-logical aspect 
that is intended with the term. It stands for an administrative style where the manner of carrying 
out policy has been subordinated to considerations stemming from the world of ideas, perceived 
or imagined. 
The four types are sketched below within their respective historical context. Subsequently 
it is shown how they can contribute to an understanding of contemporaneous Indonesian 
administration. It goes without saying that the results presented here are tentative. They are, in 
fact, borrowed from a longer work on Javanese/Indonesian administrative history, in which the 
development of the phenomenon is as important as their impact upon contemporary life 
(Hoadley 2000a). In that work it is argued that much of the inefficiency of Indonesian 
administration stems from selectivity in applying these concepts. Despite lip service paid to 
indigenous forms and an unrealistic belief in a European style rational-bureaucratic structure as 
providing the basis of public institutions, Indonesian administration is in reality an abdi-Dalem 
(courtier or servant) type in which administrators are totally subordinated to their respective 
superiors. This shift was facilitated by the fact that the colonial government had exploited, and 
thus undermined, the validity of traditional restrains. Manipulation of the so-called adat opened 
the way for introduction, even in excess, of the new nation’s ideological aspirations. Moreover 
the advent of a developmental state with its direct involvement in the country’s economic life, 
has given the manipulators of the abdi-Dalem administrative mode greatly enhanced scope of 
opportunities for accumulating power and riches at the expense of society’s expressed goals. 
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COLLEGIAL 
One of the earliest re-constructible administrative modes was that resulting from Javanese 
predilection to utilize collegial bodies for administrative purposes. The type case is the 
fourteenth-century East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. Available documentation of the 
governmental structure reveals an institutional acceptance of councils, meetings, and even 
informal gatherings in which the personal activities of King and Royal Family were aimed at 
ensuring acceptance of their governmental measures by those who were to carry out the 
sovereign’s wishes. On the more formal, legal level these characteristics found expression in the 
Majapahit judicial tribunal consisting of seven equal members, the sapto-uppapati (seven 
leaders). The college represented the realm as a whole and their judgements were arrived at 
through a processor collective discussion and mutual discussion, i.e. musyawarat mupakat 
(Hoadley 2000a). The precedent is documented for at least one important successor kingdom, 
that of the coastal principality of Cirebon, West Java, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 
The central administration was dominated by similar councils which constituted the highest 
governing bodies. This was with the addition of Islamic overtones brought in by Sunan Gunung 
Jati, West Java’s most revered wali (saint). Its judicial administration provided a continuity with 
the Majapahit sapto-uppapati e.g. the seven-member law court of the jaksa pipitu (seven judges). 
Consensus prevailed not only in the harmonizing of Sanskritic and Islamic legal traditions, but 
also within  administrative functions. All decisions had to be unanimous in order to be valid 
(Hoadley 1994). The type, dubbed “collegial-consensus” or simply “collegial”, provides an 
important element in Javanese administrative thinking. A direct connection with the past is seen 
in Indonesia’s expectations that parliamentary decisions, particularly those of the People’s 
Consultive Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) are to be arrived at by a process of 
musyawarat-mupakat, the latter by definition being unanimous. Prerequisite to any body relying 
on such a decision-making procedure is the existence of considerable consultation and 
reciprocality between all parties involved. 
Without reflecting upon the Indonesian government’s future, it can be noted that the 
administrative form had built-in advantages and disadvantages. The greatest disadvantage is time 
and vagueness. A decision reachable by a governing body of any size is bound to be conservative 
in that it must arrive at a sort of a “least common denominator” acceptable to all parties. Such a 
procedure takes time. Moreover no radical decisions are liable to emerge. One can expect 
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considerations of status and hierarchy to play an important role, especially in determining the 
direction of discussion and ultimately the decision. Western principles such as one-man-one-vote 
ideas are foreign to the system. However there is a great advantage of the collegial-consensus 
system. This comes from the consensus aspect which by definition eliminates opposition. 
Disappointment, discontent, and even potential revolt is built into a majority-minority system. 
That the fifty percent plus one can lord it over a possible forty-nine percent obviously requires an 
enforcement apparatus of considerable strength. In contrast a decision reached by consensus is, 
at least in theory, self-enforcing. Protest or even revolt against a decision one has oneself 
participated in and approved, a prerequisite of a true musyawarat-mupakat, loses any claim to a 
moral high ground. opposing such a decision is not only to renege on one’s own position but also 
challenge the society as a whole.
2
 
ABDI-DALEM 
A second indigenous administrative type comes from its opposite, namely an authoritarian 
form. Autocratic power demands or is predicated upon, a loyal administration that at each 
descending level (province or district) carries out without question or, better yet, anticipates the 
orders of the immediate superior. The type case is the “abdi-Dalem/courtier” administrative 
mode. Its characteristic feature is total subordination of state servants to the sovereign as in the 
Central Javanese empire of Mataram in the seventeenth century, or that of its successor at 
Kartasura during the first half of the eighteenth century. The tradition continued down to the 
better-documented successor states in the principalities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta which 
resulted from the division of the Javanese realm by the Dutch in 1755 (Carey and Hoadley 
2000). 
As suggested in the name, the key element of the administrative type is the subservient 
administrator or “servant of the palace” (abdi-Dalem). Investigation of original Javanese archival 
material from Central Java in at the end of the eighteenth century documents the extent to which 
the sovereign personally directed the realm’s administration, at least on paper. As is usual the 
ruler appointed the realm’s highest officials, i.e. “raised” them, simultaneously granting them 
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access to and/or use of manpower units in lieu of salary. However these grants were not common 
alienation of the realm’s resources in order to secure its proper administration. As made quite 
explicit by the extant letters of appointment, the Mataram ruler also appointed directly his 
subordinate’ officials. As a result the highest ranking ministers were served by and dependent 
upon the king’s men, not their own appointees. This limitation was in addition to the customary 
expiration of all titles of “nobility” after three generations. In any event, the sovereign retained 
ultimate control over the manpower resources granted his ministers and other subordinates. 
These could be reassigned to other officials on the sovereign’s will. The frequent redistributions 
of such manpower units and lands is well documented in The Archive of Yogyakarta. 
Within such a framework the most important characteristic of a state servant was loyalty 
and submission. The usual expression of this was the setia-durhaka relation; expectations of total 
loyalty and abhorrence of anything smelling of “treason” no mater what the provocation3. The 
more specific Javanese expression was sandika “I hear and obey” or “I will not oppose you” 
uttered before the sovereign in a position of abject subservience (sembah). To this was added the 
little recognized, but crucial requirement commonly found in the Javanese legal texts listed under 
the “aksara”. To the usual attributes of the authority of Javanese sovereigns is named aksara 
kilat (lightening) which was “....the knowing of the Sovereign will before it is uttered”.4 The 
ideal public servant or administrator in this context must know and anticipate royal will. It not 
only freed the ruler from the details of daily administration but also in modern times of 
responsibility for excesses carried out by subordinates. This also explains why it is so difficult to 
prove that ex-President Suharto did or ordered such-and-such (killing of suspected communists 
in 1965, excesses in Timor or Aceh, monetary transactions, etc.). They were the results of the 
royal will as anticipated and carried out by “effective” administrators. 
As with the collegial system, the abdi-Dalem system has its strengths and weaknesses. 
Practical application rested directly upon the relative strength of the ruler. Under a strong ruler, 
as Sultan Agung (Suharto?) the state functioned well as extension of his personal power or even 
charisma. Yet the system was institutionally shallow and hence vulnerable. Under a weak ruler, 
as Pakubuwana III of Kartasura the in-built over-centralization could no longer be sustained. 
Once it began to fall apart it usually continued to do so because of lack of institutional back-up 
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or even opportunity for subordinates’ initiative through which channels reform movements could 
be instigated. 
TEXTS 
How the two styles of administration articulated with one another can be seen from the 
nature of written juridical texts in the Javanese context. As noted earlier, the musyawarat- 
mupakat decision-making process entails finding a solution acceptable to the entire group. The 
tenacity with which parties advanced their own interests in concert with corresponding 
unwillingness to acquiesce in other’s would seem to make decisions unnecessarily time-
consuming at best and completely impossible at worst. Yet a couple of built-in features acted to 
speed up decisions. One was the emergence at an early stage of support from the majority for one 
point of view. In this case the musyawarat-mupakat is determined in advance, much along the 
lines of Orde Baru (Indonesia’s government under President Suharto 1966-98) decisions in the 
Peoples Consultative Assembly and the House of Representatives which resembled a rubber-
stamp instead of the truly collegial procedure. Particularly applicable to judicial proceedings, the 
second feature is a variant of the first. Instead of an agreement. in advance, or at a early stage, 
demonstrating overwhelming support for one measure, there could emerge a conviction as to the 
moral “rightness” of one alternative. If most of the musyawarat group were convinced of the 
moral superiority of a certain measure then the force of moral suasion would press for 
subordinating their personal wishes to the will of not only the group but, more importantly, 
supra-human justice, be it from the Hindu-Javanese past, Islam, or ingrained Javanese ideas of 
right and wrong. 
This is where the juridical texts come in. Javanese judicial texts are not concerned with 
deciding cases or even providing the wherewithal for doing so, much less with assigning 
enforceable punishments. Rather they concentrate on ascertaining the nature of behavior, 
classifying actions, and identifying degree of responsibility for them. To some extent they also 
indicate resultant penalties for respective actions, although these are generally abstract and vague 
in the extreme.
5
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thereof, about which all the judges could agree, even those judges associated with or even 
subordinate to the litigating or involved parties. It was up to the abdi-Dalem type of judiciary to 
carry out such punishments in the name of the sovereign. What is crucial here is that texts, with 
few exceptions, supported the collegial-consensus system by providing it with explanations, 
identifications, cryptic apothegms, and parables. At this point the case could be surrendered for 
further action on the authority of the sovereign or his surrogates, the abdi-Dalem/courtiers. The 
two systems were compatible, if hierarchical, rather than competitive.  
BUREAUCRATIC 
Imposition of Dutch hegemony over the island during the course of the eighteenth century 
introduced new administrative styles. Whether sponsored by the Dutch East India Company, the 
Dutch crown, or Parliament, they were all to some extent bureaucratic. They brought with them 
administrative innovations as functional specialization, departments or bureaus, organizational 
hierarchy, clearly-defined chains-of-command, meritocracy based on performance with 
corresponding demands of training and education, and goal-orientated administration. 
Motivation for their introduction stemmed from the rasion d etre of colonialism, namely 
economic exploitation of the colony for the material advantage of the metropolitan power here 
The Netherlands. Although clearly along the lines of a rational bureaucracy, especially in 
technical services as communication, infrastructure, health, and education, two factors prevented 
the emergence of more than an approximation of truly bureaucratic forms. First, the Netherlands 
Indies was run as a branch office of the Dutch ministry of colonies. Administration was, 
therefore, not autonomous in the sense that it stood or failed on its performance, nor did have the 
advantages of feed-back from subordinates. Second, from the very beginnings there grew up a 
double duality between Javanese-dominated generalist within the territorial administration and 
Dutch-initiated specialized functions within public services. 
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Acquisition of large geographic territories of Java raised the question of their 
administration. In the eighteenth century this was accomplished by imposing a Dutchman, 
“Resident”, at the local Javanese court via provisions of the various treaty arrangements. 
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Authority to ensure Javanese compliance was only in emergencies dependant upon the strength 
of the local Dutch garrison housed in a logi (fortified lodge) at Yogyakarta or Surakarta or a 
fortress at Banten, Cirebon, Semarang, and Surabaya. More usual was the Resident’s 
responsibility to convince or cajole Javanese potentates to abstain from measures hostile to 
Company interests and to carry out agreed upon measures. Maintenance of law and order (rust en 
orde) and providing access to the yields of agricultural production were the two most important. 
There was, however, a difference in priorities. For the Dutch law and order were pre-conditions 
for achieving economic results. For Javanese tata tantrem, the Javanese equivalent, was a goal in 
itself. Maintaining conditions favorable to agricultural production was a bothersome Dutch 
imposition. 
In the eighteenth century, even under indirect rule by the Company, Javanese/Indonesian 
administration was considerably modified. First and foremost were the limitations imposed on 
potentates’ freedom of maneuver. These were the direct results of adherence to the contents of 
the treaty arrangements. Breach, or even non-fulfillment, would call down the use of coercion by 
Company or, even more serious in the latter half of the century, dissolution of the pax 
Nederlandica held warring parties from each other throats. Subsequently came the first steps 
binding the Javanese elite to Dutch interests. This horizontal Dutch-Javanese elite alliance 
simultaneously weakened the vertical ties that bound Javanese to their. rulers. More 
significantly, by exploiting the nominal nature of “traditional” authority for Dutch ends, i.e. 
establishment and continuance of colonial hegemony, the moral authority, and hence ability to 
command loyalty of the masses, of the age-old rules of conduct contained in the Javanese 
customary or adat law was hopelessly compromised. Arguably the most important of 
modifications brought about in Javanese administration in the early colonial period was the 
introduction of the concept of statue law. As the potentates discovered only after some decades 
of contact with the Dutch Company, the contents of the treaty arrangements in the form of 
treaties, contracts, and concessions were obligatory, not optional. Their contents were to be 
translated into specific actions. Dutch legal hegemony over the islands’ potentates meant that the 
conditions agreed upon and recorded by the written tracts became absolute. They had built into 
their contents provisions of enforcement which were to ensure that these conditions named in the 
tracts were fulfilled. With introduction of statute law, reinforced by complementary rules and 
regulations to enforce it, the sovereign and by implication his closest advisors either fell under 
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man-made law. They were not longer servants of an endogamous force, moral, religious, or 
whatever. 
Javanese potentates subordinated to Dutch advisors became a permanent institution within 
the colony’s administration.  The pattern was strengthened by greater Dutch involvement in the 
local economy during the early nineteenth century. Dutch engagement in agricultural production 
neither directly as a royal or state enterprise during the Cultivation System (ca.1830-70) or 
indirectly through its official control over of land and labor resources allocated to private 
entrepreneurs required institutionalizing relations between Dutch holders of power and their. 
Javanese administrators at the provincial and district levels. By accepting the Raffles’ assertion 
that the sovereign was the owner of all land, the Dutch administration in essence introduced 
revolutionary changes. Access to land became conditional on compensation to the “owner”, i.e. 
the sovereign Dutch colonial government, in the form of taxes, work days, or both. This was 
based on a fundamental expectation, namely that the sovereign actually possessed sufficient 
means of coercion to back up claims of absolute ownership. Yet in the collegial-consensus 
system of West Java the regional power-holder, Bupati, by definition lacked instruments 
necessary for realizing the commitments implied by the new socioeconomic order. As the entire 
system was aimed at resolving or avoiding direct confrontation between contesting parties by a 
collegial decision-making apparatus, it was incapable of enforcing requirements demanded by a 
centralized administration. For different reasons the abdi-Dalem system of Central Java was 
equally incapable of following the new directives. This was because the system did not allow 
power to accrue below the level of the sovereign. Bupati were receivers of the Sultan’s or 
Susuhunan’s orders, not regional powers in their own right. Hence the key to Cultivation System 
administration, which set the basic pattern for the colony down to 1942, lay at the level of the 
Bupati and his subordinates.
6
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Jurnal Administrasi Publik, Vol. 3, No.1, 2004  14 
 
Needless to say, powers lacking in the collegial system and those not delegated in the abdi-
Dalem one were readily supplied by the Dutch. Without the Regents there could be no 
Cultivation System and by extension no lucrative colony The solution was for the Dutch to raise 
the Bupati to a position equivalent to that of a local sovereign and propped the office up with 
their own means of coercion. They also created an artificially maintained status differential for 
tame Bupati, complete with marks of difference, “court etiquette” and protocol. Crucial in this 
respect was the leadership of these Bupati and his subordinates. Their usefulness as a bulwark of 
continued Dutch power derived from their position as “traditional” and therefore natural leaders 
of the masses from whom loyalty was expected (see Sutherland, 1979). In terms of the typology 
used here the effect was either to transform a collegial system or to strengthen and intensify an 
abdi-Dalem one. The Dutch colonial government became the court/ruler to which they were 
subordinated and whose wishes they were to anticipate. 
SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONS 
As long as the Dutch continued to trade in the island’s surplus production of tropical goods 
the type of indirect rule described above was satisfactorily. A completely different set of 
relations were needed, however, when the Dutch involved themselves in the process of 
production. Transformation of Dutch-Javanese administrative relations was effectuated by 
changing economic ones.
7
 
Need for more effective economic exploitation of the colony led directly to the other 
development in the pubic sector on Java, namely that of specialized administrative functions. By 
this is meant areas of governmental responsibility aimed at implementing specific policies 
organized around full time employees qualified by education or training for the tasks so defined. 
Most commonly these were the results of new impositions on the local population for economic 
ends. The archetype was the indigomaaker (indigo inspector) created by the Dutch East India 
Company in the early eighteenth-century. His responsibility was to see to the improvement of the 
quality and quantity of exportable indigo delivered by the local direct producers to the Company. 
The advice given was backed by the weight of Dutch Javanese authority, the so called system of 
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“forced deliveries”. This advice, as well as better techniques for cultivation and processing of the 
raw indigo in preparation for export, not infrequently drew upon imported foreign technology. A 
far more important continuation was the corps of advisors for coffee cultivation which were 
active throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These pioneering initiatives of the 
Dutch were followed by the introduction of administrative and technical expertise concerning 
other export crops during the course of the nineteenth century. This included rice, which was 
exported to Batavia and other large cities, and more importantly sugar. These agencies and 
functions constituted functional model for much of the later technical services built up in Java 
which continued during the succeeding periods of the Ethical Policy down to 1942. With their 
origins in agricultural production they quickly extended to agriculture services such as crop 
research, disease control, irrigation services, through communications and infrastructure as roads 
and railways, post and telegraph and the like, down to health services and moderate social 
welfare initiatives. 
With little exaggeration these services can be said to be white, educated, and bureaucratic. 
Almost inevitably the head of these specialized functional offices were totok Dutchmen, i.e. 
those coming to the Indies from Holland. While some peranakan Dutch, i.e. those born and 
raised in the Indies, could become heads, “natives” no matter how well qualified could not.8 
Only with a great deal of effort could educated Javanese rise to any level of important within 
these agencies and bureaus. The peculiarities of the Indies apartheid system aside, these officials 
Javanese and Dutch, had received training and education in their line of work. Moreover, these 
services were organized along such bureaucratic lines as promotion on grounds of performance, 
full time employment with regular working hours, hierarchy of officials with a procedure for 
appeals, etc. This side of the public administration in the Indies resembled a bureaucracy in the 
Weberian sense, that is with due modifications for ethnic background. 
Even the most bureaucratic sector of the colonial administration differed from a true 
bureaucracy in that it lacked autonomy. The whole colony was run as a branch office of the 
Ministry of Colonies. All activities, no matter how specialized, were ultimately subordinated to 
the goals set by an agency of the Dutch Parliament. One of the basic rules of the game was 
unquestioning acceptance of continuation of the Indies as a Dutch colony. If a colonial civil 
servant was questioned it or, even more damning, questioned to wisdom or morality of its 
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continuation, dismissal coupled with expulsion from the colony could follow, no mater how well 
the job in question was performed.
9
 Within the colonial system extra bureaucratic demands were 
imposed, ones obviously not in keeping with a modern, rational bureaucracy. 
 IDEOLOGICAL-BUREAUCRATIC 
That rational bureaucratic forms were monopolized by the European sojourners in Java 
created problems upon the attainment of Independence in 1949. The bitter struggle with the 
intransigent Dutch who were trying to recover their former colony and Indonesian reaction to 
this meant that the new nation was deprived of the most modern bureaucratic sector of its 
administration, i.e. the Europeans. The bankruptcy of the colonial administration and the 
resultant compromising of traditional norms combined with the extremes of conscious 
engagement of administrators in political life to create what has been termed an “ideological-
bureaucracy”. Between 1945 and 1965 the new administrative mode mixed policy making with 
policy implementation, while between 1966 and 1998 it fell prey to elite controlled 
administrative thinking and action. 
During the first two decades following the attainment of independence in 1949 the 
overriding concern was with nation building. Like other newly independent nations, Indonesia 
rejected many of the basic governmental characteristics of its former colonial masters. These 
included a market economy, the binding alliances of the Cold War as NATO and SEATO, and 
after 1958 even parliamentary democracy in preference for forms considered more in keeping 
with Indonesian values. Within the administrative sphere this led to rejection of the principle that 
the state civil servants should be political neutral within the sphere of their professional 
activities. On the contrary, the Indonesian civil servants or PNS (Pegawai Negara Sipil) were 
expected to be politically engaged in activities which contributed to the establishment, 
development, and defense of the new nation. Yet since different political ideologies advanced 
different interpretations of the contents and means of attaining national goals, the central 
administration became a battleground in miniature  of the national political arena. The resulting 
“spoils system” was characterized by paralyzing competition for the reins of government, one 
which led to a grossly over-staffed government departments, corruption, and political favoritism. 
This struggle was made even more intense by the fact that with Indonesia’s failing economy, 
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only the central government and to through it political parties had the funds for carrying out 
political activities. (see Twilight in Jakarta) 
After 1966 and the establishing of the New Order under President Suharto the country was 
thoroughly de-politicized. It became in essence a one-party state under GOLKAR, an acronym 
for “functional groups”, an umbrella-collective which in theory was aimed at integrating 
representative from all walks of life in a party-like mass organization. The concept was, in fact, 
launched by President Sukarno in the early 1960s as an instrument for replacing western-style 
political parties and supporting his own version of “democracy”. In practice since 1966 the 
country has been governed by GOLKAR in which members of the military have been dominate. 
For the civil administration the New Order political machine was the flip side of its predecessor. 
PNS political engagement was retained and even expanded. What was new was the character of 
the expected engagement. The multiple interpretations of the pre 1965 period was replaced by an 
intensive propaganda campaign intended to raise the Panca Sila to a position as an all-
encompassing state ideology. As originally written into the preamble to the Constitution of 1945, 
the Panca Sila , i.e. the Five Principles--belief in God, a just and humane world, democracy 
based upon the Indonesian principles of collective decision and mutual help, and social justice--
were expressions of the new nation«s collective ideals. However the Suharto regime raised them 
to a position over the constitution, thus becoming the fount of all legitimate authority, even for 
the public administration. Textbooks, administrative manuals, and class-room materials used to 
train and up-grade civil servants almost without exception open with the assertion that the Panca 
Sila is the basis of Indonesian state authority, before turning to the by implication less important 
constitutional provisions. To complement this for the general public numerous committees and 
institutions were established to the spread and propagation of Panca Sila thinking and action. 
These effort at creating a “Panca Sila” state, i.e. one based upon the regime’s own 
interpretations, had had far-reaching consequences for the national civil administration. By the 
1970s and 80s, when the propaganda was the most intense, the pseudo (i.e. Dutch manipulated) 
abdi-Dalem/courtier administrative type had been recalled to active duty by the Suharto 
government. To its most distinguishable characteristic of loyalty to, or even anticipation of, 
superiors wishes and “as long as the boss is happy” (asal Bapak senang of Indonesian 
administration was grafted an additional ideological constraint in the form of the Panca Sila.. 
Tradition which guided the pre-colonial and even colonial abdi-Dalem/courtier administrative 
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mode was replaced by the current interpretation ultimately given Panca Sila by President 
Suharto as the highest bapak. The senatorial function of tradition which earlier ensured a 
minimum conformity with society’s ideals and mores was shunted aside by the shibboleth of the 
Panca Sila. The result is the current Indonesian administration which is characterized by lack of 
initiative, that is before the boss has made a decision as to acceptable direction; top-heavy 
steering; and in general little or no differentiation made between public authority and private 
activities, official capacity and individual self-(family)-interest, and ultimately public funds and 
the private pocket-book That public servants should be politically neutral was specifically 
rejected by Indonesian administrative teachings as was the myth of the effectiveness of the 
Weberian rational bureaucracy (cf. Miftah Thoha, 1992). Only under strong pressure of 
international donors as the IMF has the principle of political neutrality been legislated in 
November 1998, although its observation in the post election era has been close to non-existent. 
APPLICATION 
How does the above sketch contribute to understanding the dysfunctional nature of 
Indonesian public and private administration? Considerations of space dictate that only a couple 
of points can be raised. First use of the schema highlights the discrepancy between how 
Indonesia (and others) would like to see the administrative system, i.e. “Asian values” married to 
a European bureaucratic system, and reality, i.e. bureaucratic forms skewed by ideological 
concerns underpinned by abdi-Dalem traditions. Second, the observed phenomenon would seem 
to indicate that the problem lies with the basic structure of Indonesian administration rather than 
in its staffing. The following sketches in very broad terms what would be seen more as a research 
plan than a finished explanation or even hypothesis. The gap between aspirations and believe in a 
combination of collegial and Bureaucratic (bold print) and the actual situation of an unfortunate 
combination of Bureaucratic ideological and abdi-Dalem/courtier (double underline) is shown 
below. 
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Indonesia’s developmental ideas of the early years of independence centered about 
“Indonesian Socialism”. As originally stated in the preamble to the Constitution of 1945, several 
collegial features have found their way into the independent government structure. These 
aspirations are in some ways reinforced by a belief in or aspirations toward a modern 
bureaucracy in the Weberian sense. Most governmental organs and agents are defined in terms of 
rational structures and functional offices. Yet reality belies both aspirations and assumptions. 
Collegial feature tend to become purely formalities, sort of window dressing by way of 
administrative national identity and connection with the past. A sort of pseudo bureaucracy (= 
ideological bureaucratic) replaces it. The ideological orthodoxy imposed by the Suharto era, in 
which the governmental structure monopolized the official interpretation of the state ideology; 
transformed it into an instrument of control. This is when it was not empty rhetoric. The realities 
of power fell into the abdi-Dalem mode in which administrator were governed by top-down 
power of the central state, the “best” i.e. most successful, civil servants were those who rightly 
anticipated the rule’s (Suharto’s) wishes. Administrative practice was dependent upon 
congruence with the sovereign will. In short, there was no delegation of powers within a 
functional division of responsibilities or a backing up by the system as a whole via delegation-
by-rules. Both recruitment and termination of personnel was dependent upon what is politically 
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correct vis a vis the ruler. The system was based upon the principle 
“
asal Bapak senang
”
 rule 
which permeates the entire system. 
From even the short sketch presented above, the crisis in the current Indonesian 
administration appears to be structural rather than functional. Basic definitions, formulations, and 
construction of the administrative apparatus hinders piece-meal reforms of the type attempted by 
international bodies. Reforming Indonesian administration does not revolve about “merely” 
finding honest persons to man an otherwise rational bureaucratic structure: the structure, 
including definitions of official behavior/expectations, needs to be brought into line with reality. 
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